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This thesis focuses on an extensive critique of Sigmund Freud’s Moses and Monotheism (1939) 
written by a Jerusalem-born Iraqi-Jewish scholar of Semitics named Abraham Shalom Yahuda. I 
posit that Yahuda’s argument in his piece entitled “Sigmund Freud on Moses and his Torah” 
(Zigmund Freud ‘al Moshe ve Torato) rests on his analysis of three particular discourses—
temporality, rationality and subjectivity—and the way these manifest themselves in Freud’s 
work. In his biting critique of the way said themes come to the fore in Moses and Monotheism, 
Yahuda should also be seen as challenging the homogenizing project of Modernity insofar as it 
attempts to erase difference and overlay humanity onto a totalizing rubric of fundamentally 
European and Christian genealogy. Yahuda’s interpretive method articulates itself primarily in 
an expository rather than reactive register precisely because Yahuda already sees himself as 
within the Modern. As such, he can logically represent his critique of Freud as deriving from 
within parameters long established by the authoritative corpus of Jewish tradition since he does 
not recognize any obvious necessity of tension between Modernity and Tradition. What 
distinguishes this study from the extant literature on the experience of Modernity among non-
Ashkenazi Jewries is that Yahuda’s piece constitutes a direct engagement with a noted work 
which itself reflects many of the decisive trends in European Jewish Intellectual History. The 
deeply sophisticated nature of Yahuda’s critique therefore provides an opportunity to comment 
on some of the distinct characteristics of a Mizrahi perspective within Modernity. This, in turn, 
can serve the broader purpose of allowing the interpretive historical study of non-Ashkenazi 
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I. Yahuda and The Problem-Space of Mizraḥi Modernity 
 
 In many ways, Freud’s (in)famous three-chapter long work entitled Moses and 
Monotheism constitutes the hyper-realization of a certain assimilationist trend in modern 
European Jewish thought. It thus stands as an exemplary illustration of the ruthlessly rationalist 
hermeneutic of Modernity. Freud’s anti-traditionalist deconstruction of some of the most central 
tenets of Jewish faith—the Hebrew origin of Moses, the Jewish initiation of monotheism and the 
Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch—spares little in its path, evincing utter distaste for, in his 
view, the anti-rationalist and primitive nature of religion.  
 These preceding three sentences recall the manner in which most analyses of Freud’s 
work on Moses tend to begin: by demarcating the ideological stakes at hand (modernity or 
tradition) and the dialectical polarities of Freud’s argumentation (rational versus non-rational).  
Concise and lucid though these thought-parameters may be, they are ultimately reflective of a 
specifically European iteration of the experience of Modernity among Jewish peoples.  
The pitfalls of this intellectual paradigm appear most clearly when viewed through the 
lens of Modernity among Middle Eastern and North African Jewries. This was a modernity 
which, unlike among their Ashkenazi coreligionists, was experienced as a result of the expansion 
of European capital overseas and the concurrent colonial enterprise. Extant intellectual models 
typically fail to appreciate the distinctiveness of Mizraḥi perspectives within the Modern. 
Consequently, Mizraḥi Intellectuals are often located either on accepted indices of European 
intellectuality or on those of their native non-Jewish homologues, thereby making them appear 









Moreover, as Zvi Ben-Dor Benite and Moshe Behar note in their article “The Possibility of 
Modern Middle Eastern Jewish Thought,” there exists a far too common reflex to “‘test’ Mizrahi 
intellectuals against the standard, hegemonic spectrum typifying modern Jewish thinking,” a 
reflex which essentially amounts to “the denial of the very historicity of a certain position.”2 In 
opposing these overlapping tendencies, my aim is certainly not to posit an essentialist vision of 
Middle Eastern Jewish intellectuality, of an innate difference, sealed in hermetic isolation from 
contemporaneous Ashkenazi, Gentile European, or Arab streams of thought. Rather, by releasing 
Mizrahi thought from the tyranny of this litmus test approach, I aim to allow the interpretive 
study of Mizraḥi	Intellectual History to develop its own normative disciplinary standards.  
In David Scott’s Conscripts of Modernity, the author suggests that the most productive 
way to conceive of the intellectual life-world of historical subjects is as a “problem-space”— “an 
ensemble of questions and answers around which a horizon of identifiable stakes (conceptual as 
well as ideological-political stakes) hangs.”3 The problem-space within which the most 
influential circles of Ashkenazi intellectuals experienced Modernity was defined by the question 
of emancipation, as in: How can we best demonstrate that we Jews do not constitute an alien 
entity within Europe and that, therefore, we deserve legal equality? Accordingly, releasing 




















[secular] “reason” as public principle was initially seen as obligatory for justifying legal 
emancipation and subsequent entry into the modern, enlightened European square.4   
In contrast, the Mizraḥi problem-space of Modernity entailed far less of a polarizing 
polemic between faith (tradition) and reason (anti-clericalism) insofar as Mizraḥi Jewry 
experienced no comparable historically-conditioned urge to take such a strict binary upon 
themselves. Consequently, viewing Mizrahi perspectives within the Modern through the lens of 
the same conflicting gravitational pulls as were extant in Europe must immediately be 
recognized as far more of an ideological projection than a serious historical position. Above all, 
it is critical to note that Modernity was not something which could be voluntarily elected into or 
out of. Once capitalism inserts itself into pre-existing socio-economic structurations and subjects 
them to its logic, the Modern has already entrenched itself. Consequently, to follow David Scott, 
Modernity is most productively understood as a matter of “conscription.”5 Thus we must rid 
ourselves of the notion that Mizraḥi Intellectuals like Abraham Shalom Yahuda chose 
Modernity—Modernity was the sole choice which, within itself, had the capacity for a plurality 
of interpretation. 
Avraham Shalom Yahuda was born in 1877 in Jerusalem to a Jewish family of Baghdadi 
origin. He was, by all accounts, a prodigious intellectual talent who studied from a young age at 
the yeshiva of his paternal grandfather Rabbi Shlomo Ezekiel Yahuda, himself a native of 
Baghdad.6 Following his grandfather’s passing, he continued his education at several different 













the literature of adjudicative Jewish responsa (psuḳim).7 He was, therefore, deeply steeped in a 
traditional Sephardic education. While Arabic “dominated” in the Yahuda household and, as per 
his education, Avraham was thoroughly fluent in Hebrew from an early age, his wealthy family 
also afforded him the opportunity to study several European languages with private tutors.8 
Yahuda published his first book entitled The Antiquity of the Arabs at the age of 16 in 1893.9  
Several years later, he set off to pursue degrees in Semitics at the Universities of Heidelberg and 
Strasbourg. After receiving his doctorate in 1903, he accepted a position as Lecturer at the Berlin 
School for Advanced Jewish Studies.10 In 1914, he moved to Spain to accept a newly created 
chair in Medieval Sephardic Literature at the University of Madrid. There was a considerable 
amount of controversy over Yahuda’s appointment to this position as it conflicted with a Spanish 
law preventing foreign nationals from teaching a foreign language at a Spanish University.11 The 
press coverage of this episode was a major factor in Yahuda’s rising profile among European 
intellectual circles. Yahuda remained in Spain until 1922, following which he lived, lectured and 
taught in England until the early 1940’s when he chose to accept a post at The New School for 
Social Research in New York City.12 This was the last formal academic post he held until his 
death in 1951. He had an exceptionally productive career, amassing some twenty major 
academic publications in six different languages. 
 By far Yahuda’s most well-known works were published in the 1930’s while based in 















and The Accuracy of the Bible (1935) addressed the field of biblical criticism with particular 
emphasis on Egyptology. In them, Yahuda took an increasingly critical approach toward the 
studies deriving from the German school of Higher Biblical Criticism for having “degenerated 
into a mass of farfetched hypotheses and haphazard theories.”13 Yahuda was, therefore, well-
situated to respond to the claims that Sigmund Freud made in his last work, Moses and 
Monotheism (1939), a study which combined biblical criticism with Egyptology, explicitly 
building on the work of contemporary biblical scholars.  
 The deeply sophisticated nature of Yahuda’s critical assessment of Freud, entitled 
“Sigmund Freud on Moses and his Torah” (Zigmund Freud ‘al Moshe ṿe Torato), calls for 
careful discernment of three particularly consequential discourses therein: temporality, 
rationality, and subjectivity— in addition to the modernizing logics said discourses implicated.14  
By translating certain facets of characteristically modern thought for his own polemical 
purposes, Yahuda challenges the homogenizing project of Modernity insofar as it attempts to 
erase difference and overlay humanity onto a totalizing rubric of fundamentally European 
Christian derivation. This interpretive method articulates itself primarily in an expository rather 
than reactive register precisely because Yahuda already sees himself as within the Modern. As 
such, he can logically represent his critique of Freud as deriving from within parameters long 
established by the authoritative corpus of Jewish tradition since he implicitly does not recognize 















from the extant literature on the experience of Modernity among non-Ashkenazi Jewries is that 
Yahuda’s piece constitutes a direct engagement with a noted work which itself reflects many of 
the decisive trends in European Jewish Intellectual History. If we consider that the study of the 
modern Mizraḥi historical experience has in many ways been intellectually dominated by 
Ashkenazi epistemologies and aesthetics, then perhaps Yahuda ought to be understood as 
reversing the directionality of this Eurocentric logic, challenging Freud’s right to represent and 
positing his own (Mizraḥi) vision of the Jew in the Modern.15 
II.  “A Pleasant Dream”: Yahuda’s Exegesis on Ashkenazi Assimilationism16 
 Yahuda opens his piece on Moses and Monotheism with an extended meditation on the 
intellectual trend he identifies as most directly implicated in Freud’s rather heterodox claims 
against normative Jewish belief: assimilationism—that is, the ideological project of negating 
Jewish difference. In doing so, Yahuda should not be understood as wading into the extensive 
and ongoing debate on whether there exists an essence to Judaism which can be perpetuated 
outside of religious practice.17 It becomes sharply clear that such a notion is deeply troubling, 
even offensive to Yahuda. Rather, assimilationism stood out to him as primarily the process of 
integration into the temporal rhythm of hegemonic European Modernity and its constituent 
anticlerical conceit.  
 Yahuda depicts Freud as the prototype of this assimilationist trend, suggesting that “like 
many of the luminary sons of our people who assimilated into foreign peoples, he did not take 












hermeneutic over the course of this piece is that the Hebrew ruḥanī (spiritual) could be just as 
well rendered with “intellectual,” as it simply refers to something which does not pertain to the 
physical, material world. Therefore, Yahuda ought to be understood as referencing intellectual 
practices identified by him as “Jewish” just as he is referring to the concrete practice of Jewish 
faith. Consequently, conceiving of ruḥanī as encompassing these two spheres of “spiritual” and 
“intellectual” should be understood as much more of a heuristic than as an indication of a 
conscious acknowledgement on the part of Yahuda.  
 Contrarily, in Sephardi Religious Responses to Modernity, Norman Stillman imparts a 
rigidly bifurcated conception of the “intellectual” and the “spiritual” as inhabiting hermetically 
sealed spaces when he notes that “Sephardi religious responses to the challenges of a world of 
unprecedented change came primarily from within tradition itself.”19 Sephardi religious 
spirituality, it seems, exists and self-perpetuates apart from the necessarily secular intellectual 
practices of Modernity. With such a sharp separation, any response by tradition becomes 
tautologically sealed into the narrative of “reaction.” Gone is the possibility that the two might 
very well rely on an intimate, ongoing dialogue in which they each become inextricably 
implicated in one another’s production.  
 Yahuda continues by narrating the effect of the Enlightenment, or “Aufklarang”, on 
Freud’s relationship to Jewish tradition:  
Freud grew up and was educated in the period of the Aufklarang which, in 
Catholic Austria, expressed itself against religion much more than in Protestant 
Germany…If a professor were to go to synagogue for morning prayers, or to a 









using the temple of science.20 
Insofar as he is outlining some of the basic characteristics of Freud’s intellectual problem-
space— his “historico-discursive context of argument”—Yahuda also ought to be understood as 
staking a claim to his own alterity.21 The emotive tonality of his rhetoric suggests both sharp 
disapproval of “the lack of seriousness with which [proponents of Aufklarang] related to religion 
and its practitioners” as well as a clear sense of critical distance from this context in question.22 
He may understand it, have experienced it during his studies in Germany, and have evidently 
gained much intellectually from it. However, he certainly wants it to be clear that he is not of it. 
Yahuda goes on to argue that “he [Freud] believed that the conclusion of liberation 
(emancipation) canceled out the Jewish Question qua people or community.”23 Assimilated 
European Jews therefore believed in “the justness of the kingdoms of the world and the integrity 
of these foreign authorities” much in the same manner as “the adherents of assimilation […] 
from Samaria in the days of Jeroboam up to Toledo of Torquemada.”24 In Futures Past: On the 
Semantics of Historical Time, the conceptual historian Reinhart Koselleck argues that in the 
modern period “expectations that reached out for the future became detached from all that 
previous experience had to offer.”25 It is in this rapidly widening gap between the “space of 
experience” (“the present past ... whose events can be remembered”) and the “horizon of 














the modern dynamization of time into “a historical force in its own right.”26 In referencing the 
biblical King Jeroboam’s idolatry and Grand Inquisitor Tomás de Torquemada’s persecution of 
Marranos during the Spanish Inquisition, Yahuda is identifying a recognizable (Jewish) past 
which informs the assimilationism of contemporary European Jews such as Freud. Yahuda’s 
“space of experience” was therefore not wholly detached from his “horizon of expectation,” 
quite contrarily, the former closely informs the latter.27  
The allure of modernity was often depicted by assimilationist Ashkenazi intellectuals as a 
secular reformulation of the messianic ideal. This supercessionist promise of the Modern 
therefore obviated strict religious observance. To Yahuda, however, modern assimilationism 
hardly indicates a “crack in the normal passage of time” which justifies a renunciation of 
traditional Jewish eschatology, so much as it suggests the repetition of a familiar theme within a 
stable temporal space.28 This is not to suggest that the Yahuda’s temporal hermeneutic is 
resolutely anti-historical, but rather that the linearity of progressive modern historicism is not 
compatible with his tradition. In that he implicitly locates a biblical personage and a sixteenth 
century figure within the same temporal perspective, Yahuda’s point (along with the 
epistemological stance from which it derives) is distinctly historical. Indeed, later on in his piece 


















Egyptologists and Biblical Critics to renounce their past positions and acknowledge biblical 
stories as “historical facts.”29 His historicism, however, is clearly responding to a different 
modernizing logic, one born of an intellectual problem-space which did not recognize the 
secularized redemption of humanity by humanity—the very stuff of modern progressive 
historicism— as a legitimate response to its own concerns. In Sylvie Anne Goldberg’s 
Clepsydra: An Essay on the Plurality of Times in Judaism the author argues that Judaism adheres 
to “a form of temporality which permanently replays itself via the resowing of the past into the 
present.”30 In that he is identifying a temporal rhythm from the past flowing through the present 
at a consistent, identifiable velocity, Yahuda’s comments clearly support such a position.  
 Yahuda goes on to remark that, “[since] Freud sees death as the final aim and purpose of 
life, [he] cannot at all find satisfaction in a religion such as this which is optimistic at its core.”31 
Optimism is a sentiment which traces its affective power from a present attitude toward a desired 
future outcome. Yahuda is suggesting, consequently, that Judaism has the capacity to serve as 
the authoritative source for a “space of experience” which can reach out toward the desired 
messianic future in which “the world will be all justice and uprightness and peace will be held 
for all time.”32 By choosing assimilation, Yahuda sees Freud as rejecting the very emotive 
epicenter of his own commitment to an identifiable “horizon of expectation”—the age of 
messianic redemption, in Hebrew ha-‘olam ha-ba (the world to come). Redemption and its 
dialectical counterpart exile are best understood as the basic categories of what might be termed 












thoroughly anthropocentric time of Modernity. Indeed, traditional Rabbinic thought views this 
redemption as unachievable by human means. It is, and can only be, a matter of divine judgment. 
However distant and elusive this “world to come” may have seemed, normative Jewish belief 
doggedly insists that, as Walter Benjamin famously wrote, “every second remained a strait gate 
through which the Messiah might enter.”33 The future, therefore, remained intimately linked to 
the vision provided by an authoritative source of knowledge in the present. This is certainly in 
sharp contrast to the manner of anthropocentric “acceleration” toward an “open future” that 
Koselleck identifies as characteristic of European Modernity.34 Yahuda’s modern time naturally 
operated according to a different temporal rhythm insofar as it was animated by a distinct 
“historico-discursive context of argument.”35  
 In an essay entitled “The Sephardic Invention of Jewish Modernity,” Shmuel Trigano 
argues that the “Modern” signifies “above all the accession of Jews to equal rights … 
accompanied by the phenomena of secularization and the inscription of life in the present.”36 The 
total derivation of this model from the standard teleological narrative of Ashkenazi modernity 
and the casual disregard for the colonial or semi-colonial situation in which much of non-
Ashkenazi Jewry found itself is quite striking. Such a stated position, moreover, would 
thoroughly misconstrue the temporal dynamic within Yahuda’s critique of Ashkenazi 
assimilationism as being characteristically unmodern. Trigano, it seems, is more interested in 














Jewish subject than he is in interrogating what makes the problem-space of Mizraḥi modernity 
different. 
 Yahuda goes on to assert that, “in a religion such as this [Judaism], Freud saw a complete 
antithesis to his worldview.”37 In violating the form and content of normative Jewish belief, 
Freud was, to Yahuda, inexplicably breaking with the continuity of religious tradition, a tradition 
which in his mind “bases the eternal happiness of man on the fullness of morality, in the holiness 
of [his] characteristics and in the purity of thought without desire for sin.”38 To Yahuda, this 
tradition clearly constitutes the very epitome of wholeness and perfection.  
In his acclaimed study Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, the philosopher Alasdair 
MacIntyre argues that tradition constitutes “an argument extended through time” in which the 
“fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict”: either 
those with “critics and enemies external to the tradition” who repudiate the “fundamental 
agreements” or “those internal, interpretive debates through which the meaning and rationale of 
fundamental agreements come to be expressed.”39 When he identifies in Freud’s work “nothing 
other than the desire to degrade the holiness or subvert understandings which are accepted 
without questions,” Yahuda is clearly casting Freud into the former category of conflict, falling 
well outside the realm of acceptable contention and disagreement and thereby posing a threat to 
the survival of the tradition in question.40  
Certainly the literature of Rabbinic Judaism constitutes a malleable discursive tradition 
with a noted capacity to account for disagreement. The rabbinic figures therein demonstrate a 











intrepidity.”41 Critically, the internal axis of this Jewish tradition is decidedly synchronic as 
opposed to diachronic, mixing text and commentary to convey a sense of openness as well as 
timelessness. Simply put, it revolves far more around an interrogation of language’s role in the 
text than it does around a similar investigation of the text’s temporal axis. Perhaps then, insofar 
as the Jewish iteration is concerned, we would be better served by reworking MacIntyre’s 
conception of tradition into “an argument extended through text” rather than “an argument 
extended through time.” The text, of course, exists in history, but—in its ideal self-
representation— not through it. Echoing this attitude, the Jerusalem Talmud teaches that “All 
that an astute student will one day expound upon in front of his teacher was already revealed to 
Moses at Mount Sinai” (Tractate Peah 2:4). Since, according to this verse, all possible 
interpretations of the Torah had already been brought to light at Sinai, historical temporality is 
not a factor of prime importance to be interposed into textual deconstruction. By choosing 
assimilation and opting for, in his words, “a purely historical study,” Freud is placing himself 
outside of this internal dialectic of text whereby the fundamental agreements are continuously 
reworked, and into the role of an outsider, in Yahuda’s words “a heretic” who targets these 
fundamental agreements because he is so intoxicated by the prospect of acceptance into gentile 
Europe and its modern ideal.42  
 Yahuda readily submits, however, that Freud does “acknowledge his [Moses’] greatness 
and genius” and certainly “exhibits pride in his [Jewish] origin and admits that he owes much of 












expanding critique, Yahuda, makes this point in order to foreground his assertion, constantly 
stressed over the course of his argument, that it is precisely Freud’s open acknowledgement of 
his Jewish background which make his claims about Moses’ non-Hebrew origins and the 
Egyptian derivation of monotheism so very galling:  
And the most saddening thing is that specifically [daṿḳa] a Jewish scholar fell 
onto such a fabrication. The corrupting power of assimilation is so very 
great…that it sows a seed of hatred toward [our] heritage in the hearts of the great 
scholars among us.44 
 
The Hebrew word for “heritage” (moreshet) noticeably comes from the same trilateral root as the 
verb “to allow/authorize” (leharshot). With a nod to Talmudic deconstructive practices, I 
therefore submit that it is precisely reference to this “heritage” that, to Yahuda, “determines the 
epistemological, cultural and institutional limitations and possibilities within which [his] claims 
could make sense.”45 The synchronic atemporality of this moreshet combines with the 
perspective of Yahuda’s distinct problem-space to obviate the modern call to break decisively 
with tradition. To Yahuda, heritage remains the determining, decisive factor in the horizon of the 
fathomable, what was remains inextricably linked to what can be and flows through his modern 
present uninterrupted. Koselleck terms such a notion “the futurity of the past.”46 This constitutes 
the basic temporal crux of Yahuda’s developing hermeneutic. 
 Beyond the shedding of belief in “the world to come” Yahuda also identifies a more 
immediately sinister aspect to temporal assimilation. The claims made by Freud as well as other 
European-Jewish intellectuals such as Solomon Reinach, derivative of the “spirit of 












trample us underfoot and bring us around to their dearest, most sanctified beliefs and 
sensitivities.”47 This is not, therefore, simply a negative project of setting aside “Jewish time” as 
lived praxis. As Hannah Arendt incisively notes in “The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition”, 
rather than constituting “an admission of Jews as Jews to the ranks of humanity” the process of 
legal emancipation afforded the Jews only “a permit to ape the gentiles or play the parvenu.”48 
Assimilation into the progressively accelerating temporal rhythm of Modernity is thus, to 
Yahuda, also a matter of forced recourse to a different cultural pattern, one which oftentimes 
intentionally positioned itself in sharp contradistinction to all things Jewish. Not only does the 
assimilationist such as Freud shun tradition, but he also comes to adopt the epistemological 
perspective of ambient Gentile Europe— “their dearest, most sanctified beliefs and sensitivities.”  
 In this section I have been reading Yahuda’s critique of Ashkenazi assimilationism 
against the grain so as to inform the author’s understanding of the temporal relation between 
Modernity and Tradition. Yahuda’s opposition to temporal integration into the rhythm of 
hegemonic European model of Modernity suggests, to rework Foucault, an overarching critique 
of a “disaggregation of the [Assimilationist Ashkenazi] self” into “an empty [characteristically 
Gentile] synthesis,” faithlessly adrift in Modernity.49 On the obverse of this dialectic, Yahuda is 
clearly claiming for himself a “space of experience” – necessarily within the Modern—which 
remains tied to tradition and said tradition’s clear articulation of the conditions of possible 
futurity. By what means, then, might this tradition respond to the modern rationalist hermeneutic 












III. “Dressed in the Robe of Scientific Arbitration”: Yahuda on Freud’s Methodology50 
Yahuda spends the majority of his article engaging in a piecemeal deconstruction of Freud’s 
procedural approach towards the major texts in question. In his increasingly biting 
methodological criticism one can discern both a broader critique of the contemporary field of 
modern Biblical Criticism and a clear articulation of Yahuda’s own position on the appropriate 
procedure for textual exegesis.  
Yahuda stresses from the outset that Freud’s “method and investigations led him to put faith 
only in what can be proved” seeing as “the religious tradition was, to him, essentially laziness.”51 
What then constitutes proof to Freud? If, as per Yahuda, Freud sees religious tradition as 
“laziness” then the Viennese psychologist certainly must have understood himself in Moses and 
Monotheism as engaging in something radically new, something which makes a decisive break 
with irrational patterns of religious thought. This is in many ways reflective of a historically 
European and temporally modern “fetish[ization] of facticity” which views creative thought 
exclusively “as original thought, unattached to older forms of reasoning.”52 Such a fetishization 
mirrors modernity’s self-understanding as a time of progressive acceleration into an increasingly 
different future, triumphantly liberating itself from the burden of past-ness. It therefore follows, 
in Yahuda’s words, that Freud’s “scientific method” judges the Hebrew Bible to be “deficient[] 
and incomplete[]” and, likewise, the compendiums of rabbinic commentary as reflective of a 
certain intellectual indolence.53 Certainly rabbinic interlocutors with/in traditional Jewish texts do 
not typically depict themselves as creating that which is wholly new, but rather as refining and 











notes, the type of textual interpretation that the Talmudic interlocutors engage in, known in 
Hebrew as derasha, “seeks to persuade rather than demonstrate…derasha is not to resolve 
ambiguities but to generate new meanings by pointing out fresh semantic possibilities.”54 Indeed, 
“to resolve ambiguities” would be tantamount to ending the internal dialectic of text, thereby 
silencing the dialogic character of the Talmudic corpus. 
 Freud is repeatedly insistent on the insufficiency of such a derivative and thoroughly 
unscientific method of religious commentary, stressing that the “biblical record” contains 
“striking omissions, disturbing repetitions and palpable contradictions” which have been even 
further compromised by “poetical invention.”55 Since religion is, to his mind, “a collective 
neurosis of mankind” whose constituent myths are thus incapable of “pay[ing] scrupulous 
attention to logical connections,” there simply cannot be any semblance of rationality within it.56 
This is Freud’s entryway into treating the topic at hand with the particular rigors and distinct 
rationality of his psychoanalytic method. If the necessity of absolute originality is Freud’s point 
of departure, it is also precisely where he and Yahuda part ways. The very polemical ground 
upon which Freud stands is, to Yahuda, a priori unacceptable.  
Elaborating on the pitfalls of Freud’s rationalist lens, Yahuda notes that “particularly [daṿḳa] 
a scientific method such as this, which fixes nails to all that is declared as a natural category and 
establishes it a basis for scientific study without pausing for extended reflection, [such a method] 
is what caused it [Freud’s argument] to fail.”57 Yahuda is pointing here to the error of Freud’s 












ultimately leading him to read the texts in a manner in which they were not meant to be read. In 
contrast to the inherently polysemic derasha method of commentary, Freud and those he draws 
upon treat textual interpretation as a practice which seeks to “explain” and thus “displace” the 
text, “as with a code that once cracked becomes superfluous.”58 This distaste for Rabbinical 
polysemicity draws both on the logic of the scientific method so basic to Modern thought, as 
well as the much more extensive Western metaphysical tradition of logocentricism which aspires 
to “a gathering of various meanings into a ‘oneness’—a unifying order, a movement toward the 
universal.”59 
Yahuda is not, quite critically, in disagreement with the application of a rationalizing lens to 
the biblical sources in question. Indeed, in cases where a straightforward, surface-level reading 
of the biblical text would “carry a meaning that is inconsistent with a rationally-demonstrated 
truth,” then figurative readings have long been considered to be not simply acceptable, but 
absolutely required.60 The medieval Rabbi Maimonides, whose thought largely established the 
dialectical parameters of the Sephardic religious culture in which Yahuda was educated, was 
similarly insistent in his belief that trusting only the most “obvious sense” of the text will 
necessarily lead the reader “to be led astray.”61 To Maimonides, “knowing God” is a matter of 
utilizing “scientifically established truths as the keys for textual interpretation.”62 Adopting forms 
of thought outside of the strictly “religious” are not simply important to the reinvestigation and 














to an absolute divorce between scientificity and the practice of faith, reflecting a belief in the 
modern subject as a “tradition-free individual.”63 Unless we are to take a page from Freud’s book 
and characterize Yahuda as gripped by “a neurotic obsession” which follows no establish-able 
pattern of logical thought, it is quite clear that Yahuda simply recognizes no such necessary 
binary.64 To Yahuda, critiquing the work of such “clowns” who utilize “all the tools of agreed-
upon science” in order to “distort and pervert” the Bible is a profound act of faith just as it is a 
deeply intellectual dispute over the appropriate derivation of Truth from the textual resources of 
Jewish tradition.65  
Freud seeks to “fix[] nails” into the text because he requires an identifiable basis upon which 
to commence an “application of psycho-analysis” from which to then derive his scientific 
proof.66 This, then, is a specifically positivist rationalism which bases itself on a belief in the 
superiority of empiricism, observation, quantifiable data, and the logic of presence. While one 
could argue that Freud’s overriding emphasis on interiority is, in fact, a challenge to modern 
positivism, ultimately his theories do rely on the eventual discernibility of the interior, on inner 
life manifesting itself in some outward manner. If nothing else, Freud’s project of making the 
unconscious a subject of scientific study strives to make that which initially appears irrational, 
rational.  
To Yahuda, however, the psychoanalytic method is nothing less than a form of “speculative 
knowledge” and the fact that Freud wants to use it “in order to reveal the racial origins and deeds 












Yahuda requires no such logic of presence. Again, well within the Maimonidean tradition, his 
faith is in a God who is Truth (Al-Ḥaq). Consequently the “religious imperative to know god” 
and “the philosophical imperative to determine truth” are not simply reconcilable, they are 
already one.68 While Freud functions according to a inductive logic which moves from the 
critique of textual minutiae toward broader conclusions, leading him, in Yahuda’s words, “to add 
and subtract and insert foreign meanings into the material,” Yahuda works deductively from the 
general premise of divine infallibility downward into interpretation of the details.69 His deductive 
method allows him to rework certain received understandings of particulars within the text 
without calling his faith into question. Yahuda abides by rationality just as Freud does. It is, 
however, a different rationality with a different mobilizing intent.  
The question of metaphysical assumptions is then the critical point of distinction between 
these inductive and deductive methods.  While Yahuda makes no qualms about his belief in 
divine authorship, Freud claims to operate in the absolute absence of all metaphysical 
considerations. This ostensibly anti-metaphysical position reflects what is perhaps the central 
conceit of modern scientificity—that the investigation of observable phenomenon in the attempt 
to derive broader truths is a purely objective, metaphysically disinterested pursuit. Yet when one 
considers the well-documented pseudo-messianic exaltation of anthropocentricity so 
characteristic of modern thought, it becomes clear that the major metaphysical difference 
between the inductive and deductive rationalities of Freud and Yahuda respectively, is that only 
Freud pretends to operate in the absence of metaphysics. The downward movement of Yahuda’s 










question. Much in line with Maimonides’s famous assertion in The Guide for the Perplexed that 
“there is undoubtedly a limit to human knowledge,” Yahuda’s rationalist methodology allows the 
divine to remain the undisputed pinnacle of what can be known.70 This steadfast opposition to 
unsettling divinity ought not to be understood as a failure to accept a “pure” rationality on 
Yahuda’s part, so much as it ought to be seen as an expression of what he takes to be the ultimate 
rational belief—God.  
Yahuda’s eclectic intermingling of various types of knowledge in the ultimate service of 
perpetuating the dialectic of tradition is in clear tension with the notion of “the secular.” In Talal 
Asad’s Formations of the Secular, the author notes that “secularism as a doctrine requires the 
distinction between private reason and public principle, it also demands the placing of ‘religious’ 
in the former by ‘the secular’.”71 Indeed, “secular” is not simply a neutral term to describe the 
absence of religion, but rather a concept which purports to be a unifying and distinctly modern 
socio-political value. It is critical to note that the concept of “secularity” is, in the first instance, 
of historically Christian and geographically European provenance. Christianity contains the 
capacity for “secularism” within its doctrinal self, and as a result of historical processes within 
the confines of “Christendom,” it saw fit to definitively “render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, 
and unto God what is God’s” and then to export this as both a universal value and a necessary 
prerequisite for consideration as “Modern.” To import the category “secular” or “non-secular” 
into texts like Yahuda’s would be to construe their self-stylization as tradition-derived into 











Banishing religion from “public principle” and enclosing it within “private reason” was quite 
clearly a notion which speaks little to Yahuda’s appreciation of the Modern.  
The divergence between Yahuda and Freud over appropriate rationalist methods comes into 
even sharper relief when Yahuda discusses the matter of Moses’ name. In Moses and 
Monotheism, Freud notes early on that the fact that Moses’ name is quite clearly of Egyptian 
derivation and that traditional interpretations of his name fall short as “folk etymology”  
demonstrate convincingly that Moses was, in fact, himself an Egyptian.72 Responding to what he 
took to be a thoroughly heterodox claim, Yahuda sarcastically suggests that “with principles such 
as these it is possible to prove that Einstein was not a Jew, but rather a pure German; similarly to 
this, [it also becomes possible] to remove from the people of Israel all who have a foreign name 
from the days of Abraham the Aramean up to Freud the Viennese.”73 Here Yahuda might be seen 
as employing the Talmudic dialectical practice known as ledidakh (“according to you”), whereby 
the discussant adopts the opponent’s logic in order to demonstrate its faulty bases.74 While Freud 
is working from the details of Moses’ name toward a fundamental revision of the biblical 
narrative, Yahuda’s logic functions by a top-down movement, taking the Jewish origins of his 
examples as inviolable truths from which to pose a pointed rhetorical question: “Why isn’t it 


















As it happens, Yahuda is in agreement with Freud on the Egyptian etymology of Moses’ 
name. He similarly points to the traditional rabbinic commentary which suggests that Moses 
(Mosheh) was given his name by the Pharaoh’s daughter “because from the waters I drew him.” 
Freud takes issue, as others have, with the fact that Mosheh derives from the active participle of 
the Hebrew verb limshot (to draw from water) and thus is translated as “the one who draws”, as 
opposed to the more logical passive declension mashuy, “that which is drawn.”76  
As opposed to Freud, however, Yahuda argues that it is not the rabbinic explanation of the 
name that is wrong, but rather the manner in which this explanation has been understood. There 
is, he argues, a logical explanation for Moses’ name if one takes the Ancient Egyptian language 
into account. The word sheh, we are told, is the Egyptian term for “sea” or, more specifically, for 
the Nile. The word mo, he continues, simply denotes “water.”77 The logic of Moshe’s name, 
therefore, “establishes itself nicely” as simply “waters of the Nile.”78 Since the Hebrew mayim 
(water) is repeatedly used throughout the Bible to denote the Nile, Yahuda asserts, to his mind, 
the accuracy of the traditional rabbinic “because from the waters [of the Nile] I drew him” 
explanation.  
The “ideal [Rabbinic] commentary,” Daniel Boyarin notes, “explains the written language in 
a way that fits perfectly with mental speech…nothing need be supplied that is not in fact implied 
by the language.”79 In clear agreement with this line of thought, Yahuda’s aim in discussing the 
matter of Moses’ name is certainly not to critique the sources themselves or to uproot received 
understandings, but rather, through close linguistic analysis, to re-envision these received 











monotheism” as Freud asserts Judaism to be, but a religious discourse in intimate dialogue with 
modern thought.80 
Furthering his methodological insistence that psychoanalytical methods are unfit for biblical 
interpretation, Yahuda emphasizes instead the critical importance of linguistic aptitude. It is not 
sufficient to simply be able to deduce “simple and commonplace understandings” of the text, he 
insists, rather one must be able to “penetrate into the interiority of the language’s spirit, and to 
possess knowledge of its formation and its development; to understand its spirit.”81 This 
insistence echoes the absolute primacy that rabbinic literature places on language as the carrier of 
heritage, stressing that the Jewish people constitute above all “a linguistic community.”82 This 
emphasis on a “language’s spirit” and its “interiority,” moreover, is suggestive of a 
characteristically Kabbalistic belief in the specific power and vibrancy of the Hebrew language, a 
doctrine which teaches that every Hebrew letter is inscribed with certain spiritual dimensions 
which hold hidden, multifaceted meanings.83 
 In Yahuda’s The Language of the Pentateuch in its Relation to the Egyptian (1934) he 
highlights a similar belief that “archaeological and literary-historical methods” cannot adequately 





















linguistics –so far as this is feasible—that a final solution to such problems can be attained.”84 
With this stance, Yahuda ought to be understood as reworking the traditional Jewish stress on the 
preeminence of language as the proper medium for textual exegesis into the thoroughly modern 
academic field of “comparative linguistics.” Evidently, Yahuda is not at all attempting to seal off 
traditional sources from the rationalist hermeneutics of modern thought and thus protect them 
from heretical intellectuals such as Freud. On the contrary, he wants to actively expose tradition 
to the academy and sees such a pursuit as beneficial insofar as it can allow these “problems” to 
be better understood through the lens of modern scholarly practices. Indeed, he is quite explicit 
in this regard, asserting toward the end of “Sigmund Freud on Moses and his Torah” that he had 
endeavored in this piece to show “how much we can learn from Egyptian culture for our own 
benefit, particularly at a time when the Egyptologists are using it against us.”85 He emphasizes 
comparative linguistics because it is exceedingly identifiable from within the epistemological 
lineage of rabbinic interpretive methods. 
IV. “The Right of the People of Israel”: Yahuda on the Doctrine of Chosenness86 
Towards the end of “Sigmund Freud on Moses and his Torah” Yahuda explains that in 
writing this piece he had chosen “to exit the circumscribed boundaries of book criticism in order 
to judge privately on the matter at hand.”87 It is of no small significance that a well-known, 
multi-lingual scholar such as Yahuda elected to write his extensive critique of Freud in Hebrew, 
a language with unquestionably the smallest audience available to him. He was, it seems, far 












biblical criticism for a specifically Jewish readership rather than a broader scholarly community. 
His consistent usage of first-person plural forms throughout the text (“our people”, “our Moses”, 
“our Torah”) would certainly suggest as much.88 Yahuda is in fact quite explicit as to his 
motivations, explaining in his antepenultimate paragraph that he found it most pressing “to prove 
the error … of elevating the Pharaoh Ikhnaton as the initiator of monotheistic belief,” thereby, it 
is insinuated, depriving the Jewish people of that honor.89 Freud’s theory that the Pharaoh 
Ikhnaton invented and imposed “a strict monotheism” on the Egyptian Kingdom forms the 
centerpiece of his polemic, from which he argues that Moses was a scorned Egyptian priest who 
assumed leadership of the Hebraic rabble and then gave them his Ikhnatonite religion.90 
Yahuda demonstrates this focus on the Ikhnatonite theory early on when he insists that, in 
fact, “the matter of whether Moses was an Egyptian or a Hebrew is not terribly important.”91 
While Freud stresses Moses’ Egyptian origin and, as discussed earlier, Yahuda vigorously 
challenges the validity of Freud’s interpretive methods, he regardless emphasizes that the 
question of racial extraction is of minimal significance seeing as “we [Jews] are not a race in a 
principally corporeal sense—rather the essential precept is to be counted among the people of 
Israel in its Torah, its beliefs and its ethics.”92 Again, Yahuda locates this claim within the 
authoritative body of tradition, noting that neither did Moses prevent the Israelites “from 


















[‘arav rav] nor was Abraham himself “diminished insofar as he was an Aramean.”93 If, to 
Yahuda, corporeality is at best secondary to religious belief then the question of whether 
monotheism is, in fact, a practice of Abrahamic and thus Jewish origin becomes absolutely 
critical. This indicates an overriding concern with maintaining the integrity of perhaps the most 
fundamental component of traditional Jewish subjectivity—the doctrine of chosenness. Yahuda’s 
belief in Israel’s divine election is without question the sine qua non of his faith. It is, he asserts, 
“our right [to be] the ones who began calling out in the name of one God.”94 
After delving into an extensively detailed explanation of how the Ikhnetonite faith was, in 
fact, “an idolist polytheism”, Yahuda points out that this Ikhnetonite theory is hardly the first 
attempt by biblical scholars to rob Judaism of its right to be the original monotheism. He notes 
with a sharp sense of irony that “the novelty in all of this is that they want to switch the order all 
over again” seeing as how previous theories had argued that the Torah (with its constituent 
monotheism) “could not have been extant quite as early as the exit from Egypt [Yetsiat 
Mitsrayim]” and that, consequently, biblical critics would depict it as a later invention and 
“attribute it to various different [human] sources.”95 This new Ikhnetonite theory, Yahuda 
suggests, is likely derived at least in part from “a hidden hatred of the religion and traditions of 
Israel.”96 With this comment, Yahuda is suggesting that the current field of biblical criticism is 
implicated in traditional Christian-Jewish polemics in addition to, more contemporarily, the 
ideology of anti-Semitism. Yahuda is hardly circumspect as to Freud’s complicity in this regard, 
stating outright that it strikes him as though Freud’s claims are actually being made by “one of 











as this with all his soul and all his might.”97 Biblical criticism is not, therefore, simply objective 
scholarship interested primarily in obtaining Truth, but also an academic discipline deeply 
entangled in the rationalization of anti-Jewish discrimination. Whether it is by depicting “us” as 
“like all other nations” or as “a foreign and strange people, different from all others” the 
conclusion, Yahuda insists, is always “to deprive us of our rights in the past, the present and, if 
possible, the future.”98  
 Precisely what seems to confound these generations of biblical critics (among whom 
Freud is only the most recent iteration) is, according to Yahuda, the thoroughgoing uniqueness of 
Jewish history and tradition which “did not develop in the same manner as other people[s].”99 
The logic of uniformity which “foreign [goy] scholars” assume when they project their own 
“perspective” onto Jewish history is therefore fatally flawed.100 The main example of this which 
Yahuda brings to the fore is the practice of circumcision. If circumcision is, as Freud and other 
biblical scholars argue, a practice of Egyptian origin then why would Moses the Hebrew choose 
to “enslave them [the Hebrews] to a practice specific to Egyptians” rather than “destroy the 
memory of the enemy”?101 
 Responding to this issue, Yahuda reminds the reader that “not once, but rather many 
times did Moses caution us to ‘remember because you yourself were a slave in the land of 















of ‘Remember Egypt’.”102 Jewish uniqueness, therefore, belies the characteristically modern 
logic of linear uniformity which teaches that all societies follow along a set path of development 
upon which difference only exists insofar as relative positionality, as in, ahead or behind. Not 
only did the Jews invent monotheism long before any other peoples, but, he suggests, their 
tradition also ascribes to a different rationale vis-à-vis “the Other.” Much the same is implied by 
Yahuda in his concluding paragraph when he reminds that the influence which the Egyptian 
language exerted on Hebrew (a topic he addresses at length in The Language of the Pentateuch) 
should not be taken as proof of monotheism’s Egyptian origins (as Freud does) but rather as 
evidence of the historicity of the Israelite presence in Ancient Egypt.103 He is not opposed, 
therefore, to demonstrating the importance of non-Jewish influence on Jewish traditions, whether 
they be as commonplace as prayers, as sacred as circumcision, or as expansive as language. That 
Jewish practices become thereby evident as thoroughly other, ascribing to a different self-
sustaining logic, critically allows the “singular character of the people of Israel” to come into 
sharp relief.104  
 In Michel Foucault’s article “Man and his Doubles: The Analysis of the Finite” the 
author argues that while prior to the Eighteenth-century “there existed no epistemological 
consciousness of man as such… no unique and particular domain [of man],” Modernity came to 
conceive of man “because it conceives of the finite based on him.”105 Understanding the finite 
through the individual being is a form of subjectivity which necessarily supplants the Divine in 












chosenness—the fundamental of traditional Jewish subjectivity—we can thereby read an attempt 
to foil the homogenizing, individuating logic of modernity in its attempt to disaggregate and 
reorient established subjectivities toward, above all, faith in the (Gentile European) modern 
ideal. This opposition to a reorientation of Jewish subjectivity wholly apart from the internal 
tradition-based dialectic is the same critique which undergirds Yahuda’s exegesis on 
assimilationism as well as his deconstruction of Freud’s methodology. 
V. Against Conclusion, or, The Future of a Beginning 
In this study, I do not claim to have sketched the parameters of a paradigmatic experience of 
Modernity common to all Mizraḥi Jews. Rather my aim has been to highlight certain basic 
characteristics of Yahuda’s perspective within the Modern and to trace their intimate connections 
to a distinct historical problem-space which can be tentatively termed “Mizrahi.” Ultimately this 
can serve the broader purpose of allowing the interpretive historical study of non-Ashkenazi 
thought to begin developing its own normative disciplinary standards. The text around which this 
study has revolved— “Sigmund Freud on Moses and his Torah”— has made such a task all the 
more simple in that Yahuda directly engages with some of the major themes of modern European 
Jewish intellectual history, thereby making points of divergence readily discernible.  
If it has appeared as though I have devoted scant attention to the nuances of Freud’s 
argument and the broader field of psychoanalysis, this is because I am far more interested in 
exploring the significance of what Yahuda himself chooses to stress rather than adhering to some 
naive template of “correctness” in how Yahuda understands Freud. If it has appeared as though 
my treatment of Ashkenazi intellectuality is a mere caricature, void of sophistication or the 
texture of lived-experience, then my reply is twofold. I have aimed to trace the emotive tonality 






endeavor is of far more importance than judging the “accuracy” with which Yahuda understood 
contemporary intellectual debates in Ashkenazi circles. Secondly, I will make no qualms about 
the fact that Yahuda uses his take on certain aspects of Modern European thought as the screen 
on which to project his own vision of the Modern. The logic of colonial caricature so typical of 
Modern European intellectuality is thus reversed. Yahuda’s view becomes the standard and 
Freud’s interpretation a degraded, strikingly flawed attempt. Again, this dialectical tone is 
possible only because Yahuda already sees himself as inhabiting the modern, thereby allowing 
his register to be primarily expository and not simply reactive. 
In Lital Levy’s 2007 Dissertation entitled “Jewish Writers in the Arab East: Literature, 
History, and the Politics of Enlightenment, 1863-1914,” Levy stresses that the intellectual 
production of her titular subjects constitutes a form of transculturation: “a term used to designate 
a process of cultural contact and transfer that occurs within an asymmetrical power 
relationship.”106 Asserting that asymmetrical power relations constitutes a formative 
characteristic of the colonial lifeworlds in which these Mizraḥi intellectuals lived and worked is 
of course critical. The notion of “transculturation,” however, would seem to actively discourage 
analytical emphasis on continuities into the Modern by privileging the newness of this “cultural 
contact and transfer,” thereby neglecting the deeply textured intellectual milieu to which these 
individuals were heir. Yahuda’s work brings the importance of this dynamic into particularly 
sharp focus since he so clearly viewed tradition as the text onto which the modern must be 
superimposed. This, then, informs the central task of the historian of Modern Mizraḥi Intellectual 









point at which certain currents permanently slackened and others exponentially quickened. In 
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